Addressing the increasingly unmet demand for transplantable kidneys in the U.S. requires creativity due to legislation that prohibits buying and selling organs. In order to increase the number of successful transplants that take place, transplant centers have begun to implement kidney exchange programs. A patient in need of a kidney transplant and a willing but incompatible living donor can enter into an exchange program, where an incompatible donor from one pair is matched to a recipient in a second pair, and vice versa. These arrangements can extend to three or more pairs in self-contained groups, indefinitely through the use of donor chains started by altruistic donors, or simply between a single pair and a patient on the waiting list in exchange for increased priority. In this paper, I first estimate the number of additional transplants generated by kidney exchanges by analyzing how the probability of receiving an exchange transplant affects the probability that a patient experiences other transplant outcomes, including death while waiting. To do this, I create a novel measure of exchange prevalence that exploits variation in exchange activity across time and transplant centers, as well as the importance of patient proximity to centers performing exchanges. I find that 7.7 of every 10 exchange transplants represent living donor transplants that would not have occurred in the absence of exchange. Using the same approach, I estimate the resulting improvements in graft survival, match quality, and waiting time. I find that a ten percentage point increase in the probability of receiving a transplant via exchange increases one-year graft survival by 1.1 percentage points, two-year graft survival by 1.5 percentage points, and reduces waiting time by 70.9 days. *
Introduction
In 2014, 4,445 people died waiting for a kidney transplant. In the same year, 36,156 people entered a waiting list for a kidney, and only 17,108 people received a kidney transplant.
1
As seen in Figure 1 , the waiting list for kidneys grows dramatically year after year, while transplants grow at a much slower pace. Of the 17,108 kidney transplants, just over 32 percent were from living donors.
2 The importance of living kidney donation and evaluating efforts to promote it is apparent, especially when we consider the generally accepted survival advantage of living donor kidneys.
3,4
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
Addressing the increasingly unmet demand for transplantable kidneys in the U.S., while maintaining or increasing transplant quality, requires creativity due to the existence of a restrictive price ceiling put in place by the National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) of 1984. As early as the year 2000, transplant centers have been attempting to increase the number and quality of transplants by facilitating kidney exchanges among patients with willing but incompatible living donors. In the most basic type of exchange, a two-way paired exchange, patients may "swap" their willing donors when the donor from one pair is a match for the patient in another and vice versa. Another variation is list exchange, where a willing donor gives a kidney to someone on the waiting list in exchange for the next compatible 1 Based on Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) Data as of 9/4/2015, found at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov.
2 For reference, 45 percent of people 18 or older in the U.S. were registered organ donors at the end of 2012, according to the 2013 National Donor Designation Report Card published by Donate Life America.
3 While there appears to be a lack of causal evidence, it is generally accepted in the transplant community that living donor kidney transplants are more successful than those from deceased donors. Calculations based on OPTN individual-level transplant data (as of 12/31/2014) from 1988 to 2008 reveal that 3.2 percent of living donor kidney grafts failed within one year compared to 7.9 percent of deceased donor kidney grafts. Similarly, 16.8 percent of living donor kidney grafts failed within five years compared to 29.6 percent of deceased donor kidney grafts. Note that these failures also include deaths of those with non-functioning grafts within the specified time-frame. Deaths of those with functioning grafts within one year or five years were excluded from the respective calculations. 4 In their paper providing an overview of living kidney donation practices as of 2005, Davis and Delmonico (2005) suggest that this is partly due to reduced waiting time and time spent on dialysis for living donor kidney recipients compared to deceased donor kidney recipients.
deceased donor kidney for his or her intended patient in need ).
Roth and a series of coauthors contributed heavily to the development of kidney exchanges by applying existing mechanism design literature to the patient-donor matching problem, simulating and comparing the effectiveness of various mechanisms, and aiding in the realworld implementation of exchange programs (Roth et al., 2004; Roth et al., 2007; Ashlagi et al., 2011) . As a result, we have seen considerable growth in paired and list exchanges, shown in Figure My paper is the first to estimate the effects of the introduction of exchange on observed patient outcomes. I do so using OPTN Standard Transplant and Analysis Research (STAR) files, which contain the universe of waiting list registrations and transplants, along with a novel measure of exchange prevalence based on a patient's residential location and month of registration outcome. Acknowledging the possibility that some exchange recipients would have received a living donor kidney in the absence of access to exchange, I begin by estimating the number of additional living donor transplants created by the introduction of exchange.
Simulations by Roth et al. (2004) convincingly demonstrate the potential of exchange to increase the number of living donor transplants, while also accounting for the possibility of patients substituting to exchanges from direct living donors -those who give directly to known compatible patients. This pattern of behavior is consistent with the opposing trends seen in Figure 2 in direct living donations, paired exchanges, and list exchanges from 2005 to 2014. However, these simulations are unlikely to yield accurate estimates of the actual gains due to restrictive assumptions of patient preferences, and the utilization of a fixed set of potential donors and patients with only one donor corresponding to each patient. During the same time period, we see growth in transplants from anonymous donors -those who give to an unknown compatible patient. The growth of kidney exchange may explain this observation as well, since an anonymous donor's kidney can facilitate many more transplants when it 5 Based on author's calculations using OPTN data as of 9/4/2015. is used to start a donor chain -an open-ended exchange arrangement. 6, 7 The introduction of exchange may therefore crowd out some direct living donations due to substitution while crowding in anonymous donations.
[Insert Figure 2 Here] I then estimate whether the introduction of exchange improves graft survival, tissue type compatibility as measured by Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) mismatches between patients and donors, and waiting list registration duration for those who receive transplants.
Holding all else equal, we would expect to see improved overall graft survival if living donor kidneys yield longer graft survival than deceased donor kidneys and more people receive living donations with the introduction of exchange. Additionally, graft survival could improve through potential reductions in HLA mismatches and waiting list registration duration (Opelz, 1997; Meier-Kriesche et al., 2002) .
With the introduction of exchange, we would expect reduced frictions when searching for a living donor and, if exchange increases total living donations, reduced excess demand for deceased donor kidneys. Both of these effects could yield reductions in waiting list registration duration. Exchange may also provide a means for patients to receive closer matches. Simulations by Roth et al. (2004) predict reductions in HLA mismatches, though this result is likely heavily influenced by the modeling of patient preferences to depend only on tissue type compatibility and donor age. Reducing HLA mismatches is an integral part of finding suitable living donors for hard-to-match patients and, as we will see in Section 3, recipients of kidney exchange tend to be individuals who are harder to match.
6 To start a donor chain, a non-directed living donor, or "Good Samaritan" donor (according to the National Kidney Registry) who is not giving on behalf of a loved one in need, donates a kidney to a patient who has a willing incompatible donor. The willing donor of the patient receiving the non-directed donor's kidney will then donate to a patient in another incompatible pair. This process continues until no more matches are found, a recipient's willing incompatible donor backs out, or the final willing donor gives to someone on the waiting list who is not part of a pair. 7 The longest reported donor chain to date included 68 people -34 patients and 34 donors. "Longest Kidney Chain Ever Completed Wraps up at UW Hospital and Clinics," accessed 9/10/2015. http://www.uwhealth.org/news/longest-kidney-chain-ever -completed-wraps-up-at-uw-hospitaland-clinics/45549 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Subsection 1.1 provides additional background information on kidney transplantation and kidney exchange. Section 2 presents a conceptual framework modeling the impact of kidney exchange on the decision to donate, which motivates the empirical analysis. Section 3 discusses the data that I use, provides descriptive statistics, and presents a preliminary analysis of the effects of exchange on patient outcomes. The preliminary analysis motivates the two-stage least squares approach I employ in Section 4, where I use time-varying local kidney exchange activity to instrument for whether a patient receives a kidney via exchange. Section 5 presents the two-stage least squares estimates, where I find that roughly 7.7 of every 10 transplants via exchange represent transplants that would not have occurred in the absence of exchange. Conditional on receiving a transplant, I find that a ten percentage point increase in the probability of receiving a transplant via exchange increases one-year graft survival by 1.1 percentage points, two-year graft survival by 1.5 percentage points, and reduces waiting list registration duration by 70.9 days. Section 6 presents the results of various robustness checks, and Section 7 concludes.
Background on Kidney Transplantation and Kidney Exchange
There are two main treatment options available to a patient experiencing kidney failure: transplantation and dialysis. Dialysis is an ongoing treatment that can provide some of the blood filtering that healthy kidneys would perform. However, for those with chronic kidney disease or end-stage renal disease, dialysis is not a cure nor an attractive long-term treatment.
These patients can turn to transplantation for a more permanent and flexible solution. Once a patient decides to pursue a kidney transplant, they may register on a waiting list for a deceased donor kidney and/or search for a willing living donor. Patients can also search for living donors within their network of family and friends, and may be particularly likely to do so if they feel they face too long of a wait and/or they want to maximize expected graft survival time. Once a patient finds potential donors, they undergo compatibility tests. Donors are also screened for heart and lung disease, kidney function, and psychological wellness. give to those with blood type AB, and they can receive from any type.
Patients may also encounter significant difficulty in finding a willing and compatible donor for reasons other than blood type. First, patients with a high PRA score are by definition more sensitive and less likely to find a direct match. Second, if there are too many HLA mismatches between the patient and a prospective donor, it is likely that the patient's body will reject the transplant in spite of any reasonable immunosuppressive drug treatment. Opelz (1997) finds that as the number of HLA mismatches increases, graft survival decreases. Third, although the medical expenses for living donation are typically covered by the recipient's insurance or a transplant center's Organ Acquisition Fund, 14 living donation is still costly. Even if a patient is able to find a compatible living donor, that potential donor may not be able to afford the associated travel costs, time off of work, or risk of future medical problems resulting from the procedure.
15
Previous research in economics has focused on the relationship between the supply of deceased donor kidneys and living kidney donations, which may explain some of the observed decline in direct living donations from 2005 to 2014. Dickert-Conlin et al. (2011) showed that the supply of deceased donor kidneys is responsive to changes in motorcycle helmet laws. Fernandez et al. (2013) build off of this using changes in traffic safety laws, including motorcycle helmet laws, to instrument for the supply of deceased donor kidneys. The authors 14 UNOS Transplant Living, http://www.transplantliving.org/living-donation/financing-living-donation, accessed July 13, 2015
15 Although NOTA explicitly banned the exchange of valuable consideration for organs, it is now legal to reimburse living donors for certain costs incurred including lost wages and travel costs according to Section 3 of the Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act (2003) . One major source of such reimbursement is the National Living Donor Assistance Center (NLDAC). In addition, certain states have begun providing tax incentives and paid time off (for state employees) for organ donation. Unfortunately, the effects of statesponsored incentives in the form of tax benefits and paid leave have only a small and statistically insignificant positive effect on living kidney donation (Lacetera et al., 2014) .
find that the elasticity of living kidney donations with respect to the supply of deceased donor kidneys is -0.36 to -0.54 using this approach. Finally, by exploiting a discontinuity in waiting list priority based on patients' PRA scores, Sweeney (2010) finds that a ten percentage point increase in the probability of receiving a deceased donor kidney reduces a patient's probability of receiving a living donor kidney by 2.6 to 3.4 percentage points. In addition to these previous projects, it is important to consider the potential effects of the (2004) and Gjertson and Cecka (2000) that the number of HLA mismatches has little to no effect on graft survival of a compatible kidney, but goes against the earlier findings of Opelz (1997) . These survival comparisons imply non-negative changes in graft survival for those substituting toward kidney exchange and away from a direct living transplant, and an increase in graft survival for those substituting away from a deceased donor transplant. Massie et al. (2013) The authors estimate a set of negative binomial regression of total exchanges, paired and list, on a set of controls for all centers, the top 20% in terms of exchange utilization, and the top 10%. These controls include center waitlist size, proportion of waitlisted patients that received a directed living donation, distribution of waitlisted patients' race, education, age, insurance, dialysis status, and PRA. They generate the predicted number of exchanges for each transplant center based on the estimated parameters for each utilization level. Then they sum over centers' max(observed exchanges,predicted exchanges) for each utilization level.
received LDKT [living donor kidney transplant], and that inferences about dissemination of this modality would not be significantly biased by these issues," but do not provide evidence for this claim. The limited existing literature invites research addressing this question.
A representative set of simulations from Roth et al. (2004) However, using the simulated results to estimate crowd-out and match quality improvement ignores some important considerations. First, the simulations use a fixed set of patientdonor pairs, meaning that they do not allow for possible changes in the number and composition of patient-donor pairs in response to the introduction of exchange. Second, those switching from compatible living donation to exchange in the simulations are driven only 19 The researchers simulate fixed pools of 30, 100, and 300 unrelated patient/donor pairs randomly generated to closely reflect OPTN population statistics. They assume that patients' preferences are determined by maximizing the probability of a successful transplant, given certain constraints. The representative simulations cited here use 100 pairs and are based on the assumption that 40% of patients would prefer waiting list priority to their incompatible willing donor's kidney, which allows for the possibility of list exchange. Table 3 of Roth et al. (2004) for the base numbers.
by improvements in the number of HLA mismatches and donor age. In reality, many other factors may impact the decision to substitute between these two methods. In the following sections, I develop a framework and procedure that allows me to estimate the effect of exchange introduction on patient outcomes without these restrictions.
Conceptual Framework
This section develops the conceptual framework to guide the empirical work of this paper. I ask the whether the introduction of exchange increases the number of transplants, and whether patients also experience increased graft survival, increased HLA match quality, and reduced waiting times. The market for transplantable kidneys is quite unique in that it revolves around the allocation of life-saving scarce resources without the existence of a formal/legal price mechanism. This market relies on individuals making voluntary contributions upon their death or while they are alive, and living donors often receive little to no financial compensation at all for the costs they incur. Due to the lack of a price mechanism,
it is incredibly difficult to analyze the introduction of exchange as one might analyze the introduction of a new product. This is made even more difficult by the fact that patients cannot freely choose from among all of the available options at any given time; their choice depends in large part on the choices and compatibility of potential donors and the availability of deceased donor kidneys.
The introduction of kidney exchange unlocks a set of potential donors available to a patient in need. A potential living donor must only be willing and eligible to donate; the compatibility of donor and intended recipient is no longer required. The extent to which this pool of potential donors expands relies on the benefits and costs involved in giving and receiving a kidney via exchange; these are primarily determined by access to a participating exchange program and the thickness of the market -the number of other accessible incompatible pairs looking to participate in an exchange.
As the pool of potential donors for any given patient expands, the likelihood of finding a suitable living donor increases. This expansion gives the patient in need additional choices when seeking out a living donor, which could increase the patient's utility through increased likelihood of receiving a kidney, improved match quality and quality of the donor organ, improved overall well-being among potential and actual donors, reduced waiting time, and more. At the same time, as the options available to a given patient improve, there is more incentive for potential donors to free ride. A patient no longer restricted to a finding a compatible living donor or waiting for deceased donor may find it more beneficial to seek out a transplant via exchange. In the same vein, a potential compatible donor who would have given in the absence of exchange may no longer be willing to give when compatibility is no longer a strict requirement.
Consider a simple model of the potential donor's, i, decision to give to a loved one, j, in need of a kidney. The potential donor cares about her own consumption as well as the patient's transplant status. Patient j 's expected transplant status is given by
where Q j represents the quality of transplant for patient j. Kidney quality varies for each person, and for each person there is a distribution of quality given by F j (Q). The expected transplant status of patient j is conditional on the mode through which i gives to j, D ij , and the prevalence of kidney exchange, Z j . The potential donor also cares about the number of other patients who are transplanted. Given this setup, suppose i 's general utility is given by the following:
where X i is a composite good, α i is a non-negative donor-specific altruism parameter, and
represents the number of other patients receiving transplants.
Suppose i has wealth W i and the cost of i donating to j is given by C(D ij , Z j ). Potential donor i faces the budget constraint
Suppose that the cost of donating is 0 when i does not donate, implying that X i = W i when i does not donate. Suppose that exchange prevalence has no effect on expected quality and costs and that E[Q j |Direct] = Q ij when giving directly. Then, donor i 's utility when she donates directly is given by:
When she gives via exchange, her utility is:
When she does not give at all, her utility is:
There exists a quality value, Q , drawn from F j (Q) such that i is indifferent between giving directly and not at all, or where (2) = (4). For values of Q < Q , i will choose not to donate to j. Suppose that the expected transplant outcome of patient j increases when exchanges become prevalent, and that more people are transplanted. Suppose also that
, since neither option has any impact on the number of other people receiving transplants. Then,
This implies that Q increases with the prevalence of exchange and, therefore, that P [(2) ≥ (4)] decreases.
Next, there exists a value Q such that donor i is indifferent between giving via exchange
and not giving at all, or where (3) = (4). The utility of i when she chooses not to donate, (4), increases as exchanges gain prevalence, but so does her utility from giving via exchange. The cost of donating via exchange, C(Exchange, Z j ), decreases as access to exchange programs increases. Moreover, as exchange becomes more prevalent, i can help j receive a higher quality match, facilitate additional transplants for other people, and facilitate higher quality transplants for those people by donating via exchange. If (3) grows more than (4) with increasing exchange prevalence, then Q will decrease and P [(3) ≥ (4)] increases. However, this is not necessarily the case for all potential donors i ; it hinges on how much increasing exchange prevalence lowers the cost of donating, improves expected transplant quality among exchange participants, and increases the number of other patients benefitted by i 's donation when giving via exchange relative to not giving at all.
Finally, there exists a value Q such that donor i is indifferent between giving via exchange and giving directly. As the prevalence of exchange increases, (3) increases and so does (2). Here it is also ambiguous whether Q decreases as exchange prevalence increases, and therefore whether P [(3) ≥ (2)] increases. However, as the cost of donating via exchange decreases and approaches the cost of donating directly, the effect of increasing exchange prevalence on P [(3) ≥ (2)] is unambiguously positive as long as
. In words, it is unambiguously positive as long as exchange prevalence induces a larger gain in the number of other people receiving transplants when i gives via exchange rather than directly or not at all.
This model can be extended to account for potential increases in anonymous donations as well. Suppose an individual does not have a loved one in need of a kidney but cares about the number of transplants obtained by patients, such that she would get the following utility from donating anonymously:
Compare this to her utility when she does not donate:
As exchange becomes more prevalent, both (6) and (7) unambiguously increase. Then
Finally, we should not expect to see any change in deceased donor transplants as long as deceased donation rates do not respond to kidney exchanges. Such a change would require a change in how many people register as donors, the number of families that give consent once a potential donor dies, and/or a change in the number of recovered kidneys deemed transplantable. None of these seem likely given the size of the waiting list and that exchange is still a small share of total transplants despite its recent growth in utilization.
Additionally, because the waiting list is so long, there should always be someone willing and able to accept a suitable deceased donor kidney. We could see the allocation of deceased donor organs naturally shift toward areas with less paired exchange, but this should have no effect on the overall number of deceased donor transplants.
Data
In the following analysis, I use registration-level data as of December 31, [Insert Table 3 Here]
Descriptive Statistics

Preliminary Regressions
This subsection presents naïve estimates of the effects that kidney exchanges have on patient outcomes. I use patient registrations resulting in either transplant or death to estimate the following specification for each dependent variable of interest:
where DV is the dependent variable of interest corresponding to outcomes for individual i in zip code z in month t. Exchange is a binary variable indicating whether the given patient received a transplant via exchange. X is a vector of observables for patient i, including race, gender, blood type, education, previous transplant status, and age at listing. I exclude PRA due to the lack of consistency across time in the measurement and availability of PRA measures.
25 That said, the inclusion of blood type, gender, previous transplant status, and age at listing provide reasonable proxies for patient sensitivity. I include a zip code fixed effect, α z , to control for any unobserved heterogeneity across zip codes where patients live that correlates with whether the patient receives an exchange. I also include a month-year fixed effect, γ t , to control for nationwide transplantation trends and national-level policy shocks. izt is the idiosyncratic error term. The first set of outcomes include the registration outcomes -transplant from a direct living, anonymous, or deceased donor, or death while waiting for a transplant. Note that Exchange and these outcomes of interest are mutually exclusive. Each observation takes on a value of 1 for one and only one of the five outcomes. However, no two outcome variables are perfect predictors of one another. Therefore, δ can be interpreted as the share of patients receiving an exchange substituting away from the other registration outcomes.
I use fixed effects estimation of equation 8 to obtain estimates of δ for each non-exchange registration outcome. A linear model is used in order to utilize zip code fixed effects, of which there are over 25,000. A nonlinear model could be used if instead I employ fewer location-based fixed effects, such as three-digit zip code, but this is likely to do a much worse job of controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity in residential sorting. Table 4 presents the naïve substitution results. These results suggest that 3.3 of every 10 exchange recipients substituted away from direct living transplantation, or that 6.7 of every 10 exchange recipients would not have received a direct living donor transplant otherwise.
These results also suggest that 4.7 of every 10 exchange recipients would have received a deceased donor kidney, almost 0.1 would have received an anonymous donation, and 1.9 would have died while waiting. Taken together, these estimates imply that only 1.9 of every 10 exchange recipients would not have received a transplant in the absence of exchange. If we assume that there is no overall change in the number of deceased donor kidney transplants, the estimates imply that 6.6 of every 10 exchanges represent new transplants.
[Insert Table 4 Here] Table 5 presents the effects of receiving a transplant via exchange on the selected welfare measures, including graft survival after one year, two years, number of HLA mismatches, and registration duration. Recall that these measures are only defined for patients who received a transplant; they exclude the 21 percent of observations where the patient died while waiting. The results suggest that receiving a transplant via exchange improves the probability of one-year graft survival by 1.7 percentage points and two-year graft survival by 2.6 percentage points relative to the average transplant recipient. They also suggest that those receiving a transplant via exchange have a higher number of HLA mismatches with their donor and experience a reduction in waiting list registration duration of 188 days.
[Insert Table 5 Here] However, there are notable issues with these estimates. First, estimating the share of exchange recipients that substitute away from each of the other registration outcomes falls short of the goal, which is to estimate how an increase the probability of receiving a transplant via exchange affects one's probability of experiencing one of the other registration outcomes.
The estimation should allow for the coefficients of interest to be positive, which is especially relevant in the case of anonymous donation, while the naïve approach restricts the coefficients to be negative and largely determined by the observed outcome shares. Second, there are concerns of reverse causality and selection bias; patients who are unable or unlikely to find compatible living, anonymous, or deceased donations may seek out incompatible donors and particular transplant centers in hopes of receiving a transplant via exchange. Recall that the summary statistics suggest patients receiving exchanges seem to be those in more desperate circumstances, where perhaps their expected likelihood of receiving another type of transplant is low and their probability of dying before receiving a transplant is high.
Selection issues may also influence the observed effects of exchanges on graft survival, waiting time, and HLA mismatches. Individuals selecting into exchanges may be systematically different in dimensions not captured by the controls, such as PRA score and unobserved health conditions, and these differences may affect these patient welfare outcomes.
The observed positive effect on HLA mismatches highlights this concern, since we'd expect exchanges to improve average match quality holding all else equal. It is possible that those receiving exchanges are willing to trade off match quality for the benefits associated with being able to recruit an incompatible donor, or they are individuals who are hard to match and might have died while waiting for a kidney otherwise. These possibilities suggest that the estimated effects of exchange on patient outcomes are mis-measured.
IV Approach
This paper exploits variation in kidney exchange activity across location and time in order to estimate the effect of kidney exchanges on patient outcomes. I use the level of nearby kidney exchange activity in the month of a patient's observed registration outcome to instrument for the whether or not the patient receives a transplant via exchange -the Exchange variable from equation (8) Exchange activity is measured using the number of exchanges that occurred at transplant centers within 50 miles of a patient's zip code of residence, and is reduced by one if for a patient if I observe that he or she received an exchange within 50 miles.
26 This measure, call it Activity, is reflective of both the potential of local transplant centers to perform exchanges and the realization of that potential. In order for patients to take advantage of exchange mechanisms, they must have access to a transplant center implementing an exchange program. Therefore, the number of nearby exchanges is certainly impacts the probability of receiving a transplant via exchange, since patients and donors must be able to travel to transplant centers for testing and eventual transplant procedures.
I use 50 miles as the radius based on the percentiles presented in Table 6 . Most patients who receive transplants do so within 50 miles of their home zip code -between 60 and 70 26 I use GIS mapping software along with the zip codes of patients and transplant centers to determine which transplant centers are within 50 miles of the centroid of each observed patient zip code. I then aggregate over these nearby centers to determine how many transplants via kidney exchange occurred each month within the 50 mile radius.
percent overall. Figure 5 shows the average monthly number of exchanges performed within 50 miles for individuals in the sample over time and observed registration outcome. We see that this number ranges from 0 to 2.75, and tends to be higher for recipients of exchanges and anonymous donations.
[Insert Table 6 Tables 9 and 10 in Section 6. I jointly test the coefficients of the leads and fail to reject the null of no effect for all the dependent variables of interest except the proportion of patients who die while waiting. However, in the case of patients who die while waiting, the leads have a combined negative effect on current deaths suggesting that future exchange activity decreases as current deaths increase. This result is the opposite of what we would expect if centers were adopting and promoting exchanges in response to increasingly worse relative outcomes. I discuss this test in greater detail and address additional concerns regarding the exogeneity of Activity in Section 6.
IV Estimation
Consider the following set of reduced form specifications indexed by o for each outcome variable of interest:
where DV represents the outcome variable of interest. Several are used in the following analysis, including an indicator variable for transplant via exchange, anonymous donor, deceased donor, direct living donor, or death while waiting. Also included are graft survival indicators for one year and two years, the number of HLA mismatches, and registration duration. These values reflect the outcome for individual i in zip code z in month t. X is a vector of observables for patient i, including race, gender, blood type, education, previous transplant status, and age at listing. Again, I exclude PRA due to the lack of consistency across time in the measurement and availability of PRA measures. I include a zip code fixed effect, α oz , to control for any unobserved heterogeneity across zip codes where patients live that are correlated with local kidney exchange activity. Such factors might include average affluence, quality of nearby health care institutions, and proximity to higher education or other research institutions. I also include a month-year fixed effect, γ ot , to control for na-tionwide transplantation trends and national-level policy shocks. oizt is the idiosyncratic error term.
θ o captures the effect of local exchange activity on the value of outcome DV o . For transplants or deaths, this is the effect on the probability of experiencing that outcome conditional on experiencing any transplant or death outcome. For welfare measures, this is the probability of graft survival after one or two years, the number of HLA mismatches, or registration duration measured in days conditional on receiving a transplant. The main focus of the estimation results will be the ratio of θ k θ E , where θ k is the effect of Activity on any non-exchange outcome and θ E is the effect of Activity on the probability of observing a transplant via exchange. A one percentage point increase in the proportion of exchange outcomes in a given zip code and month results in change of θ k θ E in DV k . This ratio gives us our crowd-out estimates of interest as well as the effects of exchange on the selected welfare measures.
I estimate the ratios of interest directly using two-stage least squares, where the first stage specification is:
The second stage specification is:
where DV kizt is the non-exchange outcome variable,DV Eizt is the predicted probability of observing a transplant via exchange obtained from estimating the first stage specification, andλ k is simplyθ k θ E . Table 7 presents the estimates of how the probability of receiving a kidney exchange affects one's probability of receiving a direct living, anonymous, or deceased donor kidney, as well as death on the waiting list. The first column presents the first stage results, which correspond toθ E in the previous section: the effect of nearby exchange activity in the month of a patient's registration outcome on the probability that the patient receives a kidney via exchange. The estimate ofθ E is highly significant, further confirming the importance of proximity to exchange activity with respect to obtaining a transplant via exchange.
Results
[Insert Table 7 Here]
The second through fifth columns present the crowd-out estimates, which correspond to the differentλ k s. The second column shows statistically significant reduction of 0.35 percentage points in the probability of receiving a direct living transplant associated with a one percentage point increase in the probability of receiving a kidney exchange. This estimate implies that 3.5 of every 10 transplants via exchange would have been direct living donor transplants in the absence of exchange.
The third column shows a statistically significant increase of 0.12 in the probability of receiving an anonymous donation with a one percentage point increase in the probability of receiving an exchange. This suggests that for every 10 transplants via exchange 1.2 additional people decide to donate anonymously. Taken together with the second column estimate, this suggests that 10 − 3.5 + 1.2 = 7.7 of every 10 transplants via exchange represent living donor transplants that would not have occurred in the absence of exchange.
The fourth column shows that the probability of receiving a transplant via exchange has a statistically insignificant negative effect on the probability of receiving a deceased donor kidney. As discussed in Section 2, it is likely that any relationship between these two probabilities is based on the allocation of deceased donor kidneys shifting to areas with less kidney exchange prevalence, rather than a reduction in the number of deceased donor organ transplants.
Finally, the fifth column shows a statistically significant relationship between exchange and death on the waiting list; a one percentage point increase in the probability of receiving a kidney exchange decreases the probability of dying on the waiting list by a 0.63 percentage points. This suggests that 6.3 of every 10 exchange recipients would have died while waiting.
From Table 7 , it is clear that exchanges increase the number of living donor transplants. Table 8 presents what the introduction of exchange means for graft survival, the number of HLA mismatches, and the duration of waiting list registrations ending in transplant. The first column shows that a ten percentage point increase in the probability of receiving an exchange statistically significantly increases the probability of one-year graft survival by 1.1 percentage points. The second column shows an even larger statistically significant increase in two-year graft survival: 1.5 percentage points.
[Insert Table 8 Here]
The third column shows the effect of exchange introduction on HLA mismatches, one possible mechanism through which graft survival could improve (Opelz, 1997) . The estimate shows that the introduction of exchange has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on the number of HLA mismatches. While exchange may enable patients to find closer matches, patients may also be willing to accept a slightly worse match instead of having to rely on a compatible family member, for example, who may be a much closer match. Moreover, if most of those receiving kidney exchanges are harder-to-match individuals and would not have received a transplant otherwise, then we would expect their transplants to increase the overall average of HLA mismatches.
Finally, the fourth column shows the effect of exchange introduction on registration duration, another mechanism through which graft survival could improve (Meier-Kriesche et al., 2002) . This estimate is impressive: a ten percentage point increase in the probability of receiving an exchange reduces registration duration by over two months: 70.9 days. The result is clear; patients find transplants more quickly when exchanges are introduced. Part of this is likely due to the increase in living donor transplants, where the registration durations are much shorter than the wait for a deceased donor kidney. It is also likely that reduced search frictions and reduced excess demand for deceased donor kidneys contribute to this effect, though there is no clean way to isolate these different components.
Despite the clear advantages of the IV approach over the naïve regressions, there may still be some concerns with the results presented here. First, we may be worried about reverse causality in the first stage regression. Since paired exchanges often involve at least two patients being transplanted simultaneously, sometimes at the same transplant center, a patient receiving an exchange will sometimes imply the occurrence of at least one other exchange in the same month at a nearby center. Second, there may be issues caused by reverse causality in the anonymous donation regression. Since anonymous donations can facilitate donor chains, an additional transplant via anonymous donation may cause an increase in the level of nearby exchanges performed. Third, we may be curious about the sensitivity of the results to using different mileage radii in determining the level of nearby activity. Finally, we may wonder if the results are robust to zip-code aggregation, which could be considered by some a more natural approach to answer questions of crowd-out. In Section 6, I present several robustness checks to address these concerns.
Robustness
This section presents the results of robustness tests to address concerns of: prior trends in the outcome variables causing exchange adoption and promotion, reverse causality due to the use of current period exchange activity, the sensitivity of the results to using alternate mileage radii in determining nearby exchange activity, and the sensitivity of the results to aggregation to zip-code month observations. The results of these tests strongly suggest that the results in Section 5 are not plagued by such concerns.
I first test whether current outcome measures appear to affect future levels of local exchange activity. Tables 9 and 10 present the results from fitting the data to equation (9) where several leads and lags of Activity are included. 12 months of leads and lags were included, and were consolidated into two-month averages to help smooth out these measures. I then perform joint F-tests of the statistical significance of all of the leads in each specification. Death on waiting list is the only outcome for which I find suggestive evidence of an outcome variable affecting future values of Activity. The result suggests that a relative decline in deaths on the waiting list corresponds to future increases in local exchange activity, and suggests that the estimated reduction in deaths while waiting due to exchange could be overstated. However, this result is the opposite of what we would expect if centers were adopting and promoting kidney exchanges in response to worsening outcomes. Combined with the results from the tests of other outcome measures, it does not appear that local exchange activity is endogenous to trends in patient outcomes.
[Insert Tables 9 and 10 Here]
To address concerns of reverse causality resulting from the use of current-period nearby exchange activity measures, I replicate the results from Tables 7 and 8 using one-and twomonth lags of nearby exchange activity as instruments instead. Anonymous donations and exchanges can only facilitate current or future transplants via exchange, hence the use of lags to avoid the reverse causality issue. However, lags also reduce the precision of the estimates of interest. Tables 11 and 12 present the results from this exercise. We see that the estimate of direct living crowd-out is very close to the original 2SLS estimate but is now statistically insignificant, the estimate of anonymous donor crowd-in is twice the magnitude of the original, the deceased donor crowd-out estimate turns positive but is still statistically insignificant, and the statistically significant reduction of deaths on the waiting list nearly doubles in magnitude.
[Insert Tables 11 and 12 Here]
The estimates of direct living crowd-out and anonymous crowd-in are the most important for determining the change in the overall number of transplants. Together, these estimates imply that 9 of every 10 transplants via exchange represent an increase to the number of transplants performed. This is close to our original more conservative estimate of 7.7, and the two are not statistically distinguishable from one another. As for the welfare results, we see that all the magnitudes of the effects increase. However, the positive graft survival effects are no longer statistically significant and the estimated effect on registration duration becomes huge. However, the results using lagged exchange activity are still encouraging.
They suggest that, if anything, the possible reverse causality problem biases the original 2SLS estimates in a more conservative direction.
Next, I test whether the results from Section 5 are sensitive to the use of different mileage radii in determining the level of local exchange activity. Table 13 presents the crowd-out results when using a 30 mile radius instead of 50 miles. The results show a small attenuation in the crowd-out of direct living transplants, larger crowd-in of anonymous donations, crowdout of deceased donor transplants larger in magnitude and now statistically significant, and a slight attenuation in the negative effect on deaths on the waiting list. The changes in the effect of Activity on anonymous and deceased donations are the most notable, while the first stage estimate barely changes. Table 14 presents the effects on graft survival, HLA mismatches, and registration duration when using a 30 mile radius. These results are virtually identical compared to the original 2SLS estimates, except for a slight attenuation of the effect on registration duration. The observed differences suggest that the probability of receiving an anonymous donor transplant is more heavily influenced by exchange activity within 30 miles than activity 30 to 50 miles away. It is possible that the supply of deceased donor kidneys is much more responsive to immediate local exchange activity. However, it is more likely that the estimate picks up regional shifts in allocation when a smaller radius is used, which is a more coherent explanation given the extreme similarity of the results in Table 14 and the original 2SLS results.
[Insert Tables 13 and 14 Here]   Table 15 presents the crowd-out results when using a 75 mile radius instead of 50 miles.
These results are very similar to the original 2SLS results. The effect of exchange on deceased donations becomes slightly larger in magnitude and marginally statistically significant, and a there is a slight reduction in the magnitude of the effects on direct living transplants and deaths on the waiting list. Table 16 presents the effects of exchange the welfare measures when using a 75 mile radius. Again, these results are very close to the original 2SLS results, with slight attenuation in the effects on graft survival and registration duration.
[Insert Tables 15 and 16 Here] Finally, I test whether the original 2SLS crowd-out results are sensitive to aggregation to the zip code month level. The original 2SLS results relate the probability of receiving an exchange to the probability of experiencing the other registration outcomes. Aggregating yields a more direct measure of the number of additional transplants performed as a result of the introduction of kidney exchange, rather than inferring it from changing probabilities.
Moreover, this aggregation allows more flexibility in the estimates. Note that all the crowdout effects of exchange on each other outcome sum to -1 when using registration-level data.
This reveals an implicit assumption that every exchange would have resulted in one of the other four outcomes in the absence of exchange. That said, aggregating is not free; it requires averaging the controls -race, gender, blood type, education, previous transplant status, and age at listing -across all the observed outcomes in each zip code month.
Zip code month is the most natural aggregation level given the preceding analysis, and still allows for the use of nearby exchange activity based on zip code. Analogous to the modification made when using registration-level data, I remove all exchange outcomes occurring within 50 miles in a given zip code month from the nearby activity measure for that observation. Table 17 presents the results from this test, which are very similar to the original 2SLS results.
[Insert Table 17 Here]
Perhaps the similarity of the results is not very surprising given that not many zip code months include more than one registration outcome; there are 264,217 zip code month observations compared to 291,955 registration-level observations. In any case, the crowd-out coefficients no longer sum to -1 but they do come very close at -0.92. The crowd-out of direct living donors is slightly higher at -0.39 but not statistically different from -0.35, the crowd-in of anonymous donors is 0.13 compared to 0.12, the crowd out of deceased donor transplants is smaller in magnitude and still statistically insignificant at -0.083, and the reduction in deaths on the waiting list is slightly smaller in magnitude at -0.58 compared to -0.63. These estimates imply that 10 − 3.9 + 1.3 = 7.4 of every 10 exchanges are living donor transplants that would not have occurred in the absence of exchange, which is again very similar to our original estimate of 7.7.
The results of the robustness checks presented in this section strongly suggest that the results in Section 5 are not significantly plagued by the various concerns raised and addressed.
Though the exact estimates vary slightly from specification to specification, they do not appear to challenge the reliability of the original 2SLS results.
Conclusion
The growing shortage of transplantable organs has driven economists, transplant practitioners, and lawmakers to develop creative solutions. One possible solution is the introduction and explicit legalization of the exchange of kidneys among patients with willing but incompatible living donors. This innovation has grown in popularity in recent years, facilitated by single-center registries and consortia of transplant centers using computer-optimized matching mechanisms. Evaluating the extent to which exchange improves observed patient outcomes is the most direct way of evaluating efforts to introduce and promote this mode of transplantation. This paper is the first to undertake such an evaluation, and does so using administrative registration-level data along with a novel measure of local exchange activity.
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that kidney exchange programs are highly effective in increasing the number of transplants, such that 7.7 of every 10 transplants via exchange represent living donor transplants that would not have occurred in the absence of exchange. This finding is especially important given that many patients receiving exchange transplants are hard to match and face significant risk of dying while waiting for a compatible deceased donor kidney. Of the 7.7 new transplants, 1.2 come from anonymous altruistic donors who are now able to facilitate many more transplants with a single kidney donation.
Based on OPTN data as of 9/11/2015, there have been 4,782 transplants performed via paired and list exchange. The results of this paper suggest that 3,682 of those represent living donor kidney transplants that would not have happened in the absence of exchange.
In addition to creating many additional living donor transplants, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that the increasing prevalence of exchange has a significant impact on graft survival and the duration of waiting list registrations. Conditional on receiving a transplant of any kind, a ten percentage point increase in the probability of receiving a transplant via exchange is shown to increase average one-year graft survival by 1.1 percentage points, two-year graft survival by 1.5 percentage points, and reduces registration duration by 70.9 days. There is no discernible effect on match quality as measured by HLA mismatches.
The estimated improvements in transplant recipient outcomes imply that patients spend less time on dialysis, are less likely to die while waiting, and are less likely to experience transplant failure when kidney exchange is more prevalent.
Appendix A Brief History of Kidney Exchange
Exchange arrangements are created by the matching of patients and donors across incompatible pairs listed in an exchange registry. These registries may be hosted by a single transplant center, or by a consortium of transplant centers such as the National Kidney Registry and Alliance for Paired Donation where centers share their registries. These hosts match donors and patients over a range of characteristics similar to those used in ranking candidates for deceased donor kidneys with the objective of maximizing some mix of quantity and quality of matches. Each center or consortium implements its own objective function.
According to Bingaman et al. (2012) , implementing the paired exchange program at Methodist Specialty and Transplant Hospital in San Antonio, TX did not require significant additional resources. As this hospital has grown into the largest single-center paired exchange program in the United States, they have only needed to add a scheduler and full time nurse coordinator to the staff. It is likely that even fewer resources are required to join a consortium; according to Melcher et al. (2012) , the average cost of participating in the National Kidney Registry is $4,000-$6,000 per transplant and $3,000 of that is a fee for the facilitated transplant itself.
[Insert Figure 4 Here]
The first list exchange in the U.S. occurred in 1996, and the first paired exchange in the U.S. occurred in 1994. 29 Both methods started gaining popularity around the mid-2000's.
By 2014, paired exchanges accounted for 9.9 percent of all living kidney transplants and list exchanges accounted for 2.1 percent. 30 In the early years of kidney exchange, participating centers found matches manually -looking at medical charts and matching patients to donors by hand (O'Brien and Kellan, 2012; Hanto et al., 2010) . In 2005, NEPKE began using "a computer optimized matching program developed by Roth,Ünver, and Sönmez," where 29 Based on OPTN data as of 5/6/2015. The paired exchange in 1994 was an isolated event. None were observed again until 2000.
30 Based on OPTN data as of 7/10/2015.
two-and three-way matches were identified "including closed non-directed donor (NDD) and list exchange chains" (Hanto et al., 2010) . With computerized matching came sizable gains in transplants via kidney exchange. Figure 2 highlights the growth in popularity of paired and list exchange around this time period (2005) (2006) (2007) . Figure 4 reinforces this, showing growth in the number of transplant centers that performed at least one paired exchange, list exchange, or both in a given year. These figures display considerable variation across time and transplant centers in exchange activity, which I exploit in my estimation strategy. Clustered standard errors in parentheses (at zip code level) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Graft survival for 1 year excludes 2013-2014 data Graft survival for 2 years excludes 2012-2014 data Regressions include month-year fixed effects, zip code fixed effects, as well as controls for age at listing, previous transplant status, blood type, gender, ethnicity, education. Graft survival assumes survival for those whose status is "Lost" as of 1 or 2 years, and who were not reported dead within 1 or 2 years 
